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Prudence, Sunk Costs, and the Temporally Extended Self 
 
When we make major life choices, we sometimes look to our past as well as our future. But 
can doing so be in our self-interest? Is it prudentially rational? Set aside cases in which past 
actions have a causal effect on the future – no doubt I should bear in mind the fact that I’ve 
taken a big mortgage when considering downshifting, since the bank won’t let me forget 
about it. But here it’s really the fact that the bank will come after me if I don’t pay that counts. 
Set aside, too, cases in which what happened before is an indication of what is likely to 
happen in the future. It’s surely a good idea to bear in mind that my next diet will probably 
not be any more successful than the previous ones, unless I do something quite different. But 
here the past matters only insofar as it helps predict the future. In this paper, I’ll investigate 
and defend the more interesting thesis that it can be prudentially rational to give weight to 
past actions and events in choosing between possible futures even when they don’t play such 
causal or informational roles. 
 How could the past merely as such affect what it is in our rational self-interest to 
choose? Several philosophers, such as David Velleman (1991), Elizabeth Anderson (1993), 
and Thomas Kelly (2004) have argued that while we can’t change what happened in the past, 
our choices can change the significance of past events, and past events can change the 
significance of future choices. I think this is the right way to go. But this approach still 
remains underdeveloped. Here, I focus on two main questions. First, why isn’t taking our past 
actions into account simply committing the fallacy of honoring sunk costs, that is, allowing 
ourselves to be influenced by sentimental considerations that have no bearing on the expected 
utility of our options? I argue that when (and only when) we can genuinely change the value 
of past investments, this objection doesn’t apply. This is where significance comes in: I hold 
that the prudential value of events for us depends in part on what I call their teleological 
significance, roughly their contribution to our excellence as a temporally extended agents who 
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pursue long-term aims. And what we do now can change the teleological significance of past 
events, and therefore make our past better for us.  
This brings me to my second main question: why does prudence require us to care 
about our past good, rather than just present and future fortune, as many assume? In his recent 
work, Dale Dorsey (2017a) argues, roughly, that insofar as I now normatively expect my 
future self to cooperate in realizing my present projects, I owe it to myself to treat my past 
self’s projects likewise. I argue that Dorsey’s answer faces a dilemma: either we treat 
intrapersonal relations as analogous to interpersonal relations, in which case his proposal fails 
to generate prudential or rational requirements, or we take seriously the notion that we are 
temporally extended agents, in which case the puzzle he addresses does not arise. I suggest 
we should take the latter option, and show how caring about the teleological significance of 
the past is linked to attitudes like self-respect and pride. 
 
1. Commonsense Data 
Let’s start with a few brief scenarios in which it’s natural to think that what happened earlier 
matters for choosing well, setting aside moral considerations. Here’s the first one: 
Lawyer in Recovery 
Jerry is a graduate of a prestigious law school. He is determined to dedicate himself to 
a job that really makes a difference. He gets offered a position at two non-profits, one 
dedicated to assisting inner-city youth, and the other to helping immigrants. He 
believes with good justification that these are both equally worthy causes and that he’d 
be equally successful and happy doing either. There is, however, one relevant 
difference: many of the inner-city youth he’d be working with suffer from a variety of 
problems related to substance abuse. As it happens, Jerry himself has a dark history of 
alcoholism and addiction, which almost dragged him under in his mid-20s, until he 
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caught a lucky break with a former football coach, who convinced him it’s not too late 
to join a support group and go back to college. 
 
(For more scenarios like this, see e.g. Velleman 1991 and Dorsey 2015.) The way I’ve 
described the case, Jerry’s going to do just as well whichever way he chooses. Let’s suppose 
he’ll also do just the same amount of good for others. We may add that he knows that if he 
chooses to work with immigrants, he’ll never give another thought to his past, so it’s not 
going to be something that will bother him in that case. Still, there appears to be a relevant 
difference between the two scenarios. Helping kids who struggle with substance abuse isn’t 
just another worthy cause for Jerry. It’s a way of redeeming his own past struggles to some 
extent.1 He won’t have to look back on his downward spiral as a total loss any more, if he 
does look back. Instead, it will have been a way to gain insight into something important. 
He’ll make it into something meaningful, as it is natural to say. It’s not that he’ll necessarily 
feel good about it. He may or he may not, and in any case I’m stipulating that he’ll feel just as 
good in the future if he works with immigrants instead. (If it helps, imagine both offers come 
with a selective amnesia pill that will make him forget the relevant part of his past.) But he 
will have good reason to feel a bit better about his past mistakes if they turn out to serve 
something valuable. It seems reasonable for him to take this into account as one consideration 
in making up his mind. (Whether it actually is reasonable is what I’ll discuss in this paper.)  
For a real-life case of this sort, we might think of Monica Lewinsky, who was publicly 
shamed and ridiculed when her affair with Bill Clinton become public. After a long time 
trying to run away from these events, she has recently begun to work and speak for victims of 
 
1 The notion of redemption is introduced into well-being literature by Velleman (1991/2015) 
and developed by Portmore (2007). As will become clear, I cash it out in a different way. 
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online bullying. In an interview with The Guardian in April 2016, she herself said that “To be 
able to give a purpose to my past, if I’m stuck with my past, feels meaningful to me”. 
 Here’s a case that is a mirror image of the first:  
 Sell-Out Scientist 
Kathy is a well-known research biologist at a large state university. One day she gets 
an offer from an R1 University, offering her a state-of-the-art laboratory with enough 
funding to hire the best talent to work with her on whatever she wants. She also gets a 
similar offer without any teaching or admin responsibilities from a major agriculture 
corporation developing genetically modified vegetables. The catch is that she has 
spent the last nine years of her life leading an ultimately successful campaign against 
using GMO corn sold by the same agriculture corporation as cattle fodder, having 
accidentally discovered it significantly lowers cattle welfare. Alas, she realizes that if 
she takes the job with the corporation, she’ll have to give up her advocacy, and the 
changes she has wrought will quickly be reversed by a skillful, celebrity-studded PR 
campaign. 
 
Once again, Kathy is set to do equally well in either scenario, if we focus on self-interest and 
look to the future – let’s assume that the generosity of the corporate funding compensates for 
any drawbacks the option might otherwise have. If that’s difficult to believe, you may be 
underestimating the human capacity for self-deception in the sell-out option. Her past will not 
come back to haunt her if she sells out. We may stipulate that were it not for her activist past, 
Kathy might even prefer having a private lab with no admin duties. Alas, the past is there, and 
she realizes that accepting the new offer would mean undermining her signature achievement. 
Again, it seems this is a consideration that should bear on Kathy’s decision, even if she leaves 
moral considerations aside. And again, this is not, or not only, because she would feel bad 
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about it – it would be a bad idea, even if she also got a pill that would wipe the events from 
her mind (and the minds of those around her). If she were to ask for my advice, I’d tell her not 
to tarnish her own achievement by selling out. To be sure, everyone whose choice would have 
the same causal consequences would have a moral reason not to work for the corporation, but 
in her case there is an additional self-interested reason not to do so. 
 Finally, consider a different type of scenario: 
Two Awards 
Sally studies at a prestigious architecture program. Every year, the students compete 
for two prizes, the Classical or the Modernist one, either one of which will open a lot 
of doors for the future. Sally would love to have either one just as much, but one 
student can only get one, so she flips a coin and immerses herself in a project on 
rococo architecture, and comes up with a novel thesis on its unifying features. The 
Classical judges are delighted, and she is asked whether she would accept the 
Classical award. But before she does so, she is also offered the Modernist prize! 
Baffled, Sally asks the Modernist judges if they know what she’s been working on. 
They reply: “Yes, we know, but we saw how hard you worked, and we’ve never given 
a prize to anyone from your minority group before. And just a year ago, we heard you 
say you would love to have either award just as much!” 
 
Once again, if what she has done in the past didn’t matter to Sally – imagine she took the 
amnesia pill – she would be indifferent between the two awards. Of course, she might now 
anticipate feeling bad about accepting the Modernist prize, but if rationality were exclusively 
forward-looking, such feelings would be irrational, so that she should welcome a drug that 
gets rid of them. Yet it seems clear that it’s not irrational for her to have a preference between 
the awards, given her past. This time, the issue isn’t about wasting or contaminating her past 
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efforts – after all, if she hadn’t worked so hard, she wouldn’t have been offered either prize. It 
is rather that in the case of the Modernist award, her success would be related to the past in 
the wrong way, due to irrelevant factors rather than what she’s accomplished. And this, again, 
seems on the face of it like the kind of backward-looking consideration it is reasonable for us 
to take into account in making decisions.  
 
2. The First Concern: Committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy 
In the scenarios I just gave, what one has done in the past intuitively makes a difference to 
what it is rational for one to choose in one’s self-interest, apart from its causal consequences 
or informational value. Nevertheless, the idea goes against some very mainstream views about 
prudentially rational choice, according to which we should ignore any past investment, lest 
we commit the sunk cost fallacy. In this section, I’ll argue that while there really is such a 
fallacy, it is only irrational to give weight to past costs when they are genuinely ‘sunk’ – that 
is, when we can no longer change their value. 
According to standard decision theory, to choose rationally, you need to work with 
both the utility and the probability of all possible outcomes. The utility of an outcome for you 
is derived from your preferences between outcomes, provided they meet constraints like 
completeness and transitivity. So if you consistently prefer a Big Mac to a Whopper, eating a 
Big Mac has higher utility for you than eating a Whopper. When you put together the 
probabilities and utilities of all possible outcomes of an act, you get its expected utility, and 
the rational thing to do is to choose the act that has the highest expected utility. So given your 
preferences, rationality tells you to go to McDonald’s, assuming all you care about is burgers. 
 What I’ve just said is widely accepted. But many theorists also take it for granted that 
when we form preferences, we should be exclusively forward-looking. It would be a mistake 
to let past choices influence your decisions now (except insofar as they affect the future). If 
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you did so, you’d be guilty of the Fallacy of Honoring Sunk Costs, or “a greater tendency to 
continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made” (Arkes 
and Blumer 1985: 124). Sunk costs are costs you can no longer recover, and therefore should 
ignore in your choices. For example, suppose that last week you bought a ticket to see 
Televisionhead tonight for $120, but now all of a sudden, someone gives you a ticket to The 
Fillers, whom you’d much prefer to see tonight. No one else wants your Televisionhead ticket. 
It’s natural for you to think “I don’t want the $120 I paid to go to waste, so I’ll go to see 
Televisionhead”. But I agree with the economist that doing so would be irrational, if you 
really prefer The Fillers. Whatever you do, you’ll never see that $120 again. That cost isn’t 
recoverable. But you can go see the band you prefer, so that’s the rational thing to do.2 I also 
agree with the economist who points out that it’s foolish to stay in a doomed relationship just 
because you’ve already invested so much time and effort in it. It’s better to cut your losses. It 
is tempting to think such cases mean that “Things that happened in the past matter only 
insofar as they affect future outcomes”, as a recent textbook puts it (Angner 2016: 43). Call 
this view The Principle of Future Exclusivity. 
 If the Principle of Future Exclusivity is true, the intuitions I started with are cognitive 
illusions of some sort. But is it true? Why exactly is it irrational to care about sunk costs? 
Officially, decision theory is fully neutral regarding the content of your preferences, as long 
as they are coherent. In the ticket case, you prefer The Fillers to Televisionhead. But if you 
choose to see the latter instead, this reveals that you prefer the combination of seeing 
Televisionhead and making use of the ticket you bought for $120 to having paid $120 for 
Televisionhead and seeing The Fillers for free. If the utility of an outcome is simply a 
function of coherent preferences, using the ticket you bought to go see Televisionhead has the 
 
2 If, however, you would feel very bad about wasting your ticket, you should see 
Televisionhead after all. But, as Kelly (2004) emphasizes, that would not be a case of 
honoring sunk costs, but forward-looking choice based on anticipated (irrational) future 
feelings.  
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highest utility for you. (There’s nothing incoherent about preferring to see The Fillers to 
seeing Televisionhead while simultaneously preferring [seeing Televisionhead + using the 
ticket I bought] to [seeing The Fillers + throwing away the ticket].) So going to the 
Televisionhead show seems like the rational choice according to the standard decision-
theoretical picture, rather than a paradigm of irrationality! Indeed, whenever you prefer the 
combination of past investment + inferior future outcome to the combination of the 
investment with a superior future outcome, the latter has a lower utility for you by the 
standard definition of utility, and you’re irrational if you choose the better future. 
 Now, I don’t want to say, as some philosophers do, that caring about genuine sunk 
costs isn’t irrational. I think it is, even if having a reputation for taking past investments into 
account can be beneficial in some contexts, as Robert Nozick (1993) argues. But this needs 
explanation, which is not provided by the standard view, or indeed any view on that is strictly 
neutral on the content of our preferences. This is parallel to the argument that John Broome 
(1999) makes regarding the transitivity of preferences: we can always individuate options in a 
choice situation in a way that allows a seemingly intransitive set of preferences to come out as 
coherent, so when we make judgments of (subjective) rationality, we need to go beyond the 
agent’s actual preferences and ask whether they have sufficient reason to have them. The 
lesson he draws is that “it is not rational to have a preference between two alternatives unless 
they differ in some good or bad respect” (Broome 1999: 75).  
We can give a parallel explanation in the case of sunk costs. In the ticket case, you 
don’t have sufficient grounds for thinking that [seeing Televisionhead + using ticket] is better 
for you than seeing Televisionhead alone, and or that [seeing The Fillers + wasting 
Televisionhead ticket] is worse for you than seeing The Fillers. The money you spent on the 
Televisionhead ticket is gone either way. What this suggests is that you should rationally 
ignore what happened in the past when it is irrelevant to the value of your options (in the light 
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of your evidence), where the value of an option is not a function of your actual preferences, 
however coherent (since otherwise we’d lose the critical distance required to say that 
preferring the sunk cost option is irrational). That is, we must identify sunk costs in 
accordance with the following: 
 The Sunk Cost Principle  
A past investment is a sunk cost if and only if nothing you can now or in the future do 
will make a (noteworthy) difference to its value for you. 
 
The Sunk Cost Principle explains why the money you paid for the Televisionhead ticket is a 
sunk cost: whether you now use it or not, it won’t make buying it a better or worse an 
investment, at least to an extent that would make it noteworthy in deliberation. When you 
have access to sufficient evidence for this fact about value, it is irrational to prefer the 
combination of the past investment and a worse future to the combination of past investment 
and a better future. 
This explanation of the Sunk Cost Fallacy clearly departs from neutrality regarding 
the content of your preferences, since it says that caring about past investments is irrational 
only when it does no good for you in the light of what you know. My claim is thus that we 
must amend decision theory to explain why it is irrational to care about sunk costs. But there 
is in any case reason to do so, even if we don’t buy Broome’s point about transitivity. After 
all, decision theory is supposed to provide us with a normative standard for guiding and 
evaluating our choices, and it is difficult to see how it could be normative for us unless the 
inputs (the preferences that are the basis for constructing a utility function) at least fallibly 
track genuine reasons. Here I follow L. A. Paul, who proposes a simple amendment: in order 
to be rational, “we must assign our values and credences based on sufficient evidence” (Paul 
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2014: 22) – that is, rational agents don’t just base their credences on evidence, but also their 
preferences (Paul’s ‘values’). 
Importantly, on the kind of view that does link rationality and value, if we can now 
change the value of past investments, they won’t amount to sunk costs. If you’re sure that 
your relationship will not get any better, then you should break it off right now, and forget 
about whatever you’ve done in the past to fix things. But if you think there’s a chance that 
those efforts won’t have been in vain, that you may turn a corner soon, it’s less clear what you 
should do, even if a new option arises by dint of luck. Maybe you can make your past 
investment count for something. And if so, what happened before is not a sunk cost (or, more 
precisely, not all of the cost is sunk). It might be reasonable to prefer hard-won happiness to a 
stroke of luck with a new partner, other things being equal. If you can change the (preference-
independent) value of your past investments, you can to some extent ‘recover’ them. That’s 
why one can consistently think that honoring genuine sunk costs is irrational while denying 
that it is irrational to care about the significance of the past, and thus rejecting the Principle of 
Future Exclusivity.  
 
3. Prudential Value and Teleological Significance 
So, the question now is this: can we really change the value of past efforts and investments?  
A defender of the Principle of Future Exclusivity might argue that preferring a past with a 
certain significance is irrational, because how well or badly things went for us depends on 
something we can no longer change. This objection may well seem initially plausible, given 
that we can’t change what happened. The past is fixed. That’s no doubt true, when it comes to 
causal difference-making. But consider Arthur Danto’s well-known observation that in 1618, 
even an ideal chronicler with all the information about the events at the time could not have 
known that they amounted to the beginning of the Thirty Years War (1962: 154–155). The 
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core idea here is that some truths about earlier events depend on later events. This isn’t causal 
dependence. Rather, it is a kind of non-causal dependence that we sometimes try to 
characterize in the language of meaning or significance. As Danto’s case shows, it should be 
no more controversial that later events can change the significance of earlier events than that 
they can’t causally affect them. 
 So if (and plausibly only if) the prudential value of past events for us depends on their 
significance, it can be changed by what happens later.3 It is no wonder that those who believe 
in the rational importance of the past do use the language of significance in this context (e.g. 
McMahan 2002 and Kelly 2004). But what exactly does ‘significance’ mean in this context, 
and why should we think it matters for prudential value? There has been a lot less work 
spelling this out. In the rest of this section, I will summarize and develop the account I have 
proposed in past work on these issues (Kauppinen 2012; 2015a; 2015b). 
 The common intuitions about redemption, contamination, and merit I introduced in the 
first section suggest that changing the significance of the past can indeed affect its value, and 
consequently what it is rational to choose. What I’ll argue now is that such intuitions can be 
explained by principles that have a good independent rationale. The framework within which 
I’ll formulate my principles is based on the idea that if we want to know what’s 
fundamentally good for us, it’s a good idea to begin by asking who we fundamentally are. 
This is a broadly Aristotelian way of approaching things. I don’t claim that it’s the only way – 
indeed, the argument I’m going to make could fairly easily be formulated in terms of a 
subjectivist value realization view of the sort developed by Valerie Tiberius (2008) and Jason 
Raibley (2013).  
 
3 I’ve addressed formal objections to relational conceptions of final value by Bradley (2009) 
in earlier work (Kauppinen 2015a), so I will assume here that the crucial questions are matters 
of substantive value theory. 
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Nevertheless, I believe the Aristotelian approach offers an appealing and simple way 
to make sense of the intuitions. Aristotle thought that different things are good for different 
kinds of beings in virtue of their different natures (e.g. NE 1098a), and held that “what 
properly belongs to each thing by nature is most excellent and most pleasant for each of 
them” (NE 1178a). For example, plants have the potential to grow and reproduce, and they 
flourish when they do so successfully. This explains why it’s good for them to get water and 
sun. There is no need to buy wholesale into Aristotelian teleological metaphysics to agree that 
there’s something importantly right about what he says about what’s good for living things. If 
we want to know what it is for us to flourish, it makes sense to ask what kind of beings we are.  
As such, this approach isn’t necessarily partisan at the level of first-order theories of 
well-being. Both hedonism and various subjectivist views, such as preference-satisfaction 
accounts, can be seen as answers to the question of what it is for beings like us to flourish. 
They both highlight an important fact about us. One thing we fundamentally are is subjects of 
experience. This is a really deep fact about us. It’s part of what makes us human. We have 
consciousness – we’re not just there like a thing, but there’s something it’s like for us. In part 
because of this, we also have subjective preferences between possibilities and value some 
ways of life. We’d like to have certain kind of experiences and avoid others. But as the 
experience machine considerations reveal, we also value and prefer doing things rather than 
just having experiences (Nozick 1974, Lin 2016). 
 These deeply rooted values and preferences points to our other fundamental aspect, 
active agency. We are the kind of creatures who can change the world to fit better with our 
conception of how it should be. When we exercise our agency, we conceive of a goal or an 
end, think of a means to realize it, and then perhaps take those means. This results either in 
the realization of our goal, or it doesn’t. What is distinctive of human as opposed to animal 
agency is that we can think about the distant future in the light of our values, and form long-
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term goals, ends that shape the more immediate goals we pursue and the way we pursue them. 
Often the end is distinct from the actions themselves, such as when you aim to cure a disease, 
but it is also possible to aim just at doing something well, such as when you aim to be a good 
father (see NE 1140b). 
 Now, my quasi-Aristotelian thesis is this: exercising agency well is a crucial part of 
what it is for us to fare well. After all, this is what we can’t do inside the Experience Machine. 
But what kind of exercise of agency is good for us? Traditionally, Aristotelians have adopted 
perfectionist views, according to which what’s basically good for us is the development and 
exercise of our natural capacities (Kraut 2007, Bradford 2015). But I want to take a different 
tack that avoids the difficult challenge of identifying capacities worth developing and 
exercising in an evaluatively neutral way. So instead of traditional perfectionism, I’ll take it as 
my starting point that from the perspective of agency, our life consists of a series of events 
and actions that pertain to the realization of our aims. In an important sense, our life goes well 
when these things go our way. A little more precisely, my general thesis is the following: 
 Teleological Significance 
The non-instrumental prudential value of a subject’s life for her at time t is determined, 
in part, by the teleological significance of the actions and events that constitute her life 
at t. The teleological significance of an action or an event is its contribution to the 
subject’s excellence as the kind of goal-directed agent she is – in the case of humans, 
temporally extended and fallibly reasons-responsive. 
 
What I’ll do in the rest of this section is suggest two simple diachronic principles for 
teleological significance, which are motivated by this conception of our nature, and explain 
the common intuitions I started with.4  
 
4 Again, I’m drawing and elaborating on earlier work, especially Kauppinen 2012 and 2015a. 
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The first and most obvious principle is motivated by the thought is that since agency is 
about pursuing aims, something contributes to excellence as an agent when it contributes to or 
constitutes success in realizing our aims. Compare the following brief scenarios: 
 Success/Failure 
Alex studied hard for the entrance exam, learned many new things, and was accepted. 
Before he found out about the results, he was killed in an accident. 
Bert studied hard for the entrance exam, but wasn’t able to grasp the material, and was 
rejected. Before he found out about the results, he was killed in an accident. 
 
While both Alex and Bert met a tragic end, it seems to me that Alex’s life went in one respect 
better than Bert’s, even if their experience was the same (maybe both came away from the 
exam thinking they had nailed it). It may have been because she had more skill than Bert, or 
simply better luck. Either way, contributing to success in our aims is one way in which 
something can benefit us as agents. So cases like Success/Failure suggest the following 
simple principle: 
 Instrumentality  
Other things being equal, an exercise of agency is finally prudentially good for you to 
the extent it contributes positively to reaching your aims. 
 
I emphasize that we’re talking about final (or non-instrumental) prudential value here: it is 
finally good for us (other things being equal) for our actions to serve our purposes rather than 
be wasted. Or perhaps better, it’s finally good for us as agents that we make progress towards 
our aims. It is, of course, also instrumentally good for us, but my claim is that the value of 
making progress isn’t reducible to its instrumental value. Instead, whenever we make 
progress, we are actualizing the potential we have as goal-directed agents, and thus realizing 
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our nature, to put it in Aristotelian terms. Note also that the Instrumentality isn’t restricted to 
present aims – progress towards future aims also counts, which will be important in the big 
picture.  
Instrumentality captures the aspect of intrinsic value that is highlighted by simple 
achievementists like Simon Keller (2004). But I’m not persuaded by simple achievementism. 
One important difference is that the Instrumentality Factor focuses on progress towards the 
aim rather than realizing the aim as such, and also allows contribution to future aims count, as 
I just emphasized. In addition, I join many critics in thinking that when we exercise our 
agency in pursuing aims, direction matters as well as effectiveness, when it comes to 
excellence. It is better for me to be successful at solving the problem of mass-producing 
photovoltaic cells cheaply than at making a handwritten copy of the celebrity gossip website 
tmz.com, so as to have something to peruse in case I lose my Internet connection. So I take it 
that other things being equal, it is better for us to pursue goals that are objectively valuable. 
I’m not going to take a stand here on exactly which things are objectively worth pursuing, but 
presumably they include things like justice, artistic excellence, and scientific knowledge. 
The second way in which actions at other times can affect teleological significance is 
raising the stakes of success or failure. Consider the following pair: 
 Diligent/Lucky 
Diligent Ellie undertakes an expedition to Peru to find a full skeleton of a 
brachiosaurus. She puts together a detailed plan, informed by reading a vast literature 
on the topic, and goes through a laborious fund-raising process. After a painstaking 
search and two weeks of intense, backbreaking digging, she is in possession of a full 
skeleton of a brachiosaurus. 
Lucky Florence undertakes an expedition to Peru to find a full skeleton of a 
brachiosaurus. Without a more specific plan, she hitches a ride to the airport. In the 
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lounge she meets a billionaire who gives her a lift in his private plane. Once in Peru, 
she heads straight for the closest bar. As she falls asleep on the patio, a mutt of 
indeterminate breed befriends her, and brings her a bone. Florence gives the dog a 
sausage left behind by another customer, and throws the bone in the back of an 
abandoned pick-up truck. This scenario repeats itself for two weeks. At the end of it, 
she is in possession of a full skeleton of a brachiosaurus. 
 
Other things being equal, success in reaching the goal matters more to Diligent Ellie’s well-
being than it does to Lucky Florence’s. It boosts the value of her life more than it does 
Florence’s, and failure would be worse for her than for Florence. There is more at stake for 
her excellence as an agent. People have tried to cash out this sense in various ways – for 
example, for Gwen Bradford (2015), Ellie’s success is more of an achievement than 
Florence’s. My preferred idiom, however, is that of merit: since Ellie’s success results from 
her developing and exercising her capacities and skills to a greater degree than Florence’s 
success, which is due to sheer luck, her success is more merited. Merit, on this conception, is 
non-moral, gradable and relative to the realization of a specific aim. Plausibly, several 
different factors combine to determine the level of merit relative to an aim-realization, 
including the amount of effort the agent makes and the extent to which success manifests the 
agent’s abilities rather than external factors. (There is a lot to say on this challenging topic, 
but I cannot go further here.) 
The Diligent/Lucky case suggests the following principle: 
 Merit  
Other things being equal, an agent’s degree of merit intensifies the final value of 
success or failure in pursuit of her aims. 
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While Instrumentality shows how our present actions can affect the teleological significance 
of past actions and events, Merit shows how past actions can affect the teleological 
significance of future actions and events (beyond their causal role). Roughly, the harder you 
try, the more you have to gain or lose in the future. I don’t claim that Instrumentality and 
Merit exhaust the factors that affect teleological significance – for example, the degree to 
which an agent identifies with an aim will also raise the stakes of success or failure – but they 
will do for my purposes here.  
It is worth highlighting what’s not on the list: the satisfaction of past preferences as 
such. This is a good thing, since it is very implausible that it would in any way benefit me to 
go on a rollercoaster ride on my future 50th birthday, if I will then dread the unpleasant 
prospect, even if I really wanted to celebrate the birthday that way when I was 11 (cf. Parfit 
1984: 157). Things are otherwise if I’ve actually pursued a worthwhile aim, even if I no 
longer have it – if I’ve given up trying to publish my poetry collection, and you successfully 
bring it to the attention of Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, there is something to be said in favor of 
what you’re doing from the perspective of my self-interest, given Instrumentality. This 
distinction helps, in part, to clarify what’s going on in genuine cases of sunk costs. Simply 
buying a ticket to a Televisionhead show is a borderline case of pursuing the aim of seeing the 
band, and the stakes of success are low, given Merit. Essentially, you just had a preference for 
spending tonight in a particular entertainment, even if you did something minimal to make its 
satisfaction more likely. That’s why it won’t make a noteworthy difference to the value of 
your past whether you use the ticket or not, which makes it a sunk cost.  
 
4. Explaining the Common Intuitions 
Armed with these simple principles for teleological significance as well as the Sunk Cost 
Principle I defended in Section 2, we can account for the prudential rationality of caring for 
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the past in the right circumstances. Roughly speaking, my claim about value was that beyond 
their effect on our experience, things we do and things that happen to us are good for us to the 
extent that they contribute to bringing about merited success in worthwhile aims we identify 
with. 
 So let’s go back now to Jerry, our lawyer in recovery. Focus on the things he did in his 
wasted youth. Many times, he decided to take another swig or head for another dive. At the 
time, beyond the ephemeral pleasure that they gave him, they contributed to nothing but his 
spiral towards self-destruction. What happened, happened. Presumably, if he takes an 
unrelated job working for immigrants, it won’t make a difference to the significance of the 
past. So if we look at the value of the different segments of his life, the picture looks like this: 
there’s a bad part in the past, and good ones later. But since he has the options he does, he can 
now change the significance of the past actions and events. If he chooses to work with people 
who are now making the mistakes he left behind, he can draw on his experiences to serve 
them better than he would otherwise have. He can empathize more deeply and advise more 
effectively. It may be painful for him occasionally to be reminded of what he’s ashamed of. 
But if those bad choices turn out to have been necessary for him to learn something important, 
he can take some pride in having made the best of them, and regret them less. 
 What makes his life story a redemption story is that his earlier mistakes turn out to 
contribute positively to future success. This makes his past better for him than it would have 
otherwise been. Here it seems clear that what it is for him to change the significance or 
meaning of his past just is for him to change its teleological significance. Redemption is, to be 
sure, only one example. But I think we can cash out other relevant kinds of meaning or 
significance in the same way. The sell-out scientist Sally’s contamination story is a mirror 
image of Jerry’s story. By undermining her own achievement, she makes it the case that her 
earlier efforts did not after all contribute to the realization of a valuable goal, except for a 
 19 
brief and relatively insignificant while. It would be bad enough if someone else annulled her 
success. But the fact she does it herself intensifies the significance of her failure. 
 Does it matter for changing the value of past activity whether we make use of it to 
promote the original aim? On Dale Dorsey’s (2017a) account, it does, since we can only 
benefit past selves (of our own or of others) by contributing to the success of past projects or 
satisfying past pro-attitudes. In contrast, Gilbert Harman observes that we do, as a matter of 
fact, sometimes adopt new ends that “help to rationalize and give significance to what we 
have been and are doing” (1976: 462), and seems to endorse this as a form of practical 
reasoning. I side here with Harman, as my treatment of Jerry’s case shows. In his wasted 
youth, Jerry’s project was getting wasted. If he makes use of what he learned in the course of 
that activity, he’s not in any way completing that past project. Nevertheless, he can make his 
past meanderings worth something. Mutatis mutandis, the same goes for Monica Lewinsky. 
When she engaged in an affair with Bill Clinton, her aim wasn’t to collect materials that 
would help in future anti-bullying campaigns. Nevertheless, by making use of her experiences 
in the service of later goals, she was able to partially redeem her earlier choices. This is 
evidence in favor of the Aristotle-inspired view over Dorsey’s more subjectivist account. (I’ll 
come back to other issues with his view below.) 
 How about the Two Awards case, then? Instrumentality won’t suffice to account for 
such cases, since Sally’s efforts will pay off either way. But only receiving the Classical 
award constitutes merited success, since only it is based on achievements that manifest 
Sally’s skilled exercise of her capacities. Here her past exercises of agency increase the value 
of one outcome, making it better for her than an initially equally good one. The case is, to be 
sure, a somewhat contrived one, since we don’t often get to choose between merited and 
unmerited success. It’s perhaps not quite as rare, however, to choose between a demanding 
path and a shortcut to the same goal. In such situations, the demanding option typically has 
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opportunity costs (we could be promoting some other worthwhile aim, too), so it is overall not 
worth choosing. But in the absence of such opportunity costs, or just opportunity costs that 
are outweighed by increased merit, it may well be in our best interest to take on a challenge.5 
  
5. Second Concern: Why Care About My Past? 
Someone who accepts that I can change the significance and value of my past might still 
wonder why prudence requires (or even permits) caring about the past. Isn’t it in my best 
interest to focus just on the present and future? In Dale Dorsey’s (2018) terms, even if I can 
benefit my past self, why should I do so? Dorsey proposes an ingenious answer for the special 
case of project-related goods, with respect to which he argues prudence requires temporal 
neutrality. He starts with the thesis that “to achieve a project-related good at t, the success 
conditions of which occur at times later than t, requires cooperation between one’s t-self and 
selves at times other than t” (2018, 1916). Given the need for cross-temporal cooperation, if I 
now embark on a project like knitting a sweater, prudential rationality requires being 
committed to taking the necessary steps in the future – taking a cooperative attitude toward 
my future self. According to Dorsey, this means that I now expect that my future self will 
“recognize the effort one’s past self has put in, and cooperate for the sake of the success of the 
project” (2018, 1918).  
 Dorsey next observes that every present self is some future self’s past self, so that “in 
adopting the cooperative attitude now, I am explicitly committed to my future self granting 
normative status to my present self—that is, my future self’s past self—in rendering my 
current efforts a success rather than failure” (2018, 1919). Combining this attitude with a bias 
towards the present and future – in other words, giving little or no weight to my past self’s 
projects – is “normatively unsavory” (ibid.). After all, it is parallel to normatively expecting 
 
5 As Bradford (2015: 95-7) observes, in a utopia in which no activity is instrumentally 
necessary, we’re better off inventing games that require the exercise of our capacities. 
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someone to return a favor to me while at the same time refusing to return the very same favor 
to someone else. 
 While Dorsey’s approach is characteristically inventive, I’m going to argue it suffers 
from two major problems: first, it does not satisfactorily answer the question, and second, the 
question itself is a bad one. First, on Dorsey’s picture, as he frames it, when you take the 
cooperative attitude, you normatively expect your future self to give weight to your present 
project, and if you combine this with giving no weight to the projects of your past self, you 
have a set of attitudes that is “incompatible with what one owes to oneself” (2018, 1921). The 
problem is that Dorsey’s argument trades on equivocation between the self as temporally 
extended and a momentary self. When he talks about relations among past, present, and future 
selves, which in his terms “mirror” interpersonal relations, he is committed to such selves 
being distinct entities – how else could attitudes like faith or normative expectation be 
possible? But when he talks about owing something to oneself, he tacitly switches to a 
temporally extended notion, since this “oneself” turns out to be the very same self now and in 
the future, as we’ll see in a moment.6 He can’t have it both ways. This means his approach 
faces a dilemma: either the self is momentary, in which case the normative unsavoriness he 
identifies disappears, or it isn’t, in which case the very puzzle he addresses dissolves, or so 
I’ll argue.  
To begin with the first horn, consider what his argument sounds like if we stick 
strictly to the terminology of distinct selves. The present-and-future biased t0 self expects the 
t10 self to treat her investment in her project as a reason to complete it, but ignores the projects 
 
6  The same ambiguity or equivocation can be seen in Dorsey’s talk of commitment. For 
example, he says “the prudentially rational agent will in fact be committed to one’s future self 
taking the necessary steps to render one’s currently-embarked-upon projects successes rather 
than failures” (2017a: 17). It certainly makes sense for a temporally extended agent to be 
committed to doing something in the future. But how could my present self be committed to 
my future self doing anything? This makes no more sense than my being committed to you 
doing something. 
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of the t-10 self. What does the t0 self owe to herself? One thing is for sure: she is not her t-10 self 
(or, depending on your metaphysics, isn’t her t-10 self any more), so she doesn’t owe herself 
anything regarding the t-10 self. There’s nothing prudentially unsavory about the combination 
of attitudes that the t0 self has (assuming, charitably, that talk of prudence has a sense in the 
first place when it comes to time-slice selves). It is only if the present and past selves are one 
and the same that it makes sense to talk about the present self owing it to herself (and not to 
another self) to take her past self’s – which is to say, her own – interests into account. Or, to 
put the point differently, if we conceive of intrapersonal relations as mirroring interpersonal 
ones, as Dorsey does, we lose the unity that is needed to identify a prudential tension among 
attitudes at or toward different times.7 
 Suppose, then, that we start instead with the assumption that your self is temporally 
extended – that your past, present, and future ‘selves’ are not really selves in the plural. It’s 
just you at different times. What does this mean for the rationality of caring about the past? 
To get a grip on this, it’s instructive to consider a parallel issue regarding intentions for the 
future. One distinctive role of intentions is intrapersonal coordination over time, which makes 
possible actions whose completion takes time by ruling out options that clash with one’s plans 
(Bratman 1987). However, this key feature of intention leads some philosophers of action 
worry about what is sometimes called ‘the problem of diachronic autonomy’: how can we 
make decisions regarding our future actions without enslaving our future selves? (Ferrero 
2010) How can it be rational for a later self to abide by the decisions of a past self rather than 
consider each situation anew (which would, of course, defeat the very purpose of forming 
intentions for the future)? If we formulate the problem like this, we see the same pattern as 
 
7 Could there be a moral tension instead? Although Parfit (1984) makes some suggestions 
along these lines, the idea is highly implausible. Time-slice selves that go in and out of 
existence instantaneously are far from the kind of subject to whom we have obligations, or 
who can be bearers of duties. 
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with Dorsey’s account: there’s an earlier self and a later self, and a question about rational 
relations between them. 
 However, as Julia Nefsky and Sergio Tenenbaum (forthcoming) argue, it is this very 
conceptualization of the issue that makes it appear that there is a problem. While many of 
those who worry about diachronic autonomy or self-governance over time officially recognize 
that our selves are temporally extended, they nevertheless slip into a time-slice conception of 
the self when they formulate the question. The problem with this, Nefsky and Tenenbaum 
point out, is that “On a time-slice conception, your relation to your past selves is of the same 
type as your relation to other people. So, your past self can only decide – or, settle a practical 
question – for you in the sense that someone else can settle a practical question for you.” 
(forthcoming, no page number) They argue that once we articulate the question in these terms, 
we’re faced with a ‘puzzle’ that is unsolvable, because there is no analogue between future-
directed intention and its execution in our relations to others. But, most importantly for my 
purposes, they also emphasize that no puzzle arises, if we take the notion of a temporally 
extended self seriously. There’s no philosophically interesting difference between deciding to 
call my grandmother right now and doing so, on the one hand, and deciding to call my 
grandmother after finishing this paragraph and doing so then, on the other. In both cases, the 
self who decides and the self who acts are the very same. As Nefsky and Tenenbaum put it, 
“To think that being moved to act directly by the intention I formed earlier would be a case of 
lacking autonomy is, again, to mistakenly treat my future self and past self as two different 
agents.” (forthcoming, no page number) 
 My view is that the situation is just the same when it comes to the prudential 
rationality of caring for the past. Again, I am the same agent, the numerically same self I was 
before. There is no more a puzzle about why I should care about making my past actions more 
successful, say, than there is about trying to succeed in my present and future endeavors. I 
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should care for the significance of my past actions just as much and for the same reason as I 
should care about my present or future ones, unless there is some significant discontinuity in 
my life that does warrant serious talk of a ‘past self’ (or ‘future self’ for that matter). Once we 
recognize that we’re temporally extended selves, the problem that Dorsey addresses does not 
arise. Asking why I should care about the good of my ‘past self’ is just asking why I should 
care about my own good at a past time – which should not generate any particular puzzle if 
we grant, as Dorsey does, that we can affect our good at a past time. 
 At this point, some might worry that this gives too much weight to the past. Surely we 
shouldn’t be indifferent between equal past and present benefits to ourselves, but prefer the 
latter! Here, the first thing to bear in mind is that in the actual world, it’s rare for us to face 
such a choice, since we can usually do much less now to affect the teleological significance of 
past actions than the significance of present or future ones, and we can’t affect other aspects 
of the value of the past. But suppose we must choose between past and future benefits on a 
particular occasion. Maybe I was brought up in a weird religious cult, as a result of which my 
core project as a teenager was filling a lake with trash. However, as I came into contact with 
the outside world, I abandoned the project halfway through, and got into engineering 
recyclable photovoltaic cells. By some weird coincidence, I could now just as easily make 
either my current project or my past one successful (but not both). Other things being equal, 
isn’t there a big prudential difference between completing the abandoned project and 
completing the one I’m currently committed to?8  
My answer is that there is a difference by default, but it’s because other things are 
typically not equal, not because past-directed benefits count for less. First, in scenarios like 
the cult case, the challenge gains intuitive force from the past aim being misguided or 
worthless. So imagine it’s the other way around: I used to develop photovoltaic cells, but on 
 
8 I thank a reviewer for this journal for posing this challenge. 
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the verge of breakthrough, got converted by the cult, and now have the aim of filling the lake 
with trash. My claim is that it would be better for me to contribute to the success of my past 
actions by completing the project I abandoned for bad reasons, assuming the benefits of doing 
so aren’t outweighed by ancillary costs (such as being ostracized by cult members).9 If I chose 
success in the present project when it meant failure of the past one, it would be fitting for me 
to regret it. What this suggests is that in the original cult case, the explanation for why I 
shouldn’t contribute to the past project is that there is more worthwhile aim I could now serve, 
and not the mere fact that the other aim is a past one. 
What if the projects are on a par when it comes to value, however? Doesn’t prudence 
still require me to work for the present aim? Yes, by default. First, it’s clear that there are 
indirect benefits to completing the present project – for example, realizing a rejected aim 
won’t bring me joy, and in fact might displease me (Dorsey 2018, 1921). But second, present 
plans may have a more direct prudential significance. As I noted, intentions can only play 
their role in temporally extended agency if they rule out conflicting plans unless the agent 
reconsiders. It has not proven easy to explain just why and when our aims have this sort of 
authority (see Ferrero 2010 for discussion). But as long as they do, I can’t rationally be 
indifferent between the goal I actually have and a different goal I could have, even if they’re 
equally worthwhile. (If I have evidence of a clearly better alternative, I should reconsider, and 
perhaps return to a project abandoned for a bad reason.) By definition, my past goals are no 
longer my actual goals. So by default, I display excellence in temporally extended agency by 
working for present rather than past aims, when there isn’t a notable difference in value, merit, 
or likelihood of success. This explanation, again, doesn’t appeal to the pastness of past aims, 
but simply to the default priority of my actual aims over other possible ones, whether past, 
 
9 Bear in mind that we’re assuming there’s sufficient psychological continuity to ensure that it 
is still clearly myself who would receive a past-directed benefit, not a past self from whom 
I’m now estranged. 
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present, or future. So even if present projects by default have prudential priority over past 
ones, this doesn’t show that I shouldn’t care equally about the teleological significance of my 
past actions, other things being equal. It just shows that by default, other things are not equal 
if there is a clash between present and past aims. 
Next, let’s come back to the question of why we should care about our own good at 
any time in the first place. I won’t attempt a full answer, but I do want to point to a link 
between caring about the teleological significance of our actions in particular and various 
self-directed attitudes. I’ll begin with self-respect. At least since Kant, philosophers have 
linked respect with rational agency and the special dignity it gives us. If we respect ourselves, 
we won’t allow others to use us for their purposes, but insist on making up our own minds 
about which ends to pursue, and try to live up to these commitments (Dillon 1997). This is not 
compatible with undermining one’s own past (or present) achievements for some future good 
that is not of comparable significance. (Would it be respectful towards someone else to 
undermine their achievements, past or future?) Someone who is willing to sully her own past 
manifests a kind of servility, unless she has changed her mind for sufficient reason about 
which ends are worth pursuing. More subtly, if we fail to take advantage of an opportunity to 
make our past pursuits count for more when it would amount to a net benefit, we distance 
ourselves from who we were earlier. I think this can also betray a lack of self-respect – my 
past self is after all just me at an earlier point in time, so if I have a sense of self-worth, I can’t 
be indifferent to the success of my earlier pursuits and commitments any more than I can be 
indifferent to the success of my current ones. At least to this extent, then, respecting ourselves 
requires taking teleological significance into account. 
 Second, the teleological significance of our actions is what makes many self-directed 
attitudes warranted or fitting, so insofar as don’t just care about how we feel, but also about 
having good grounds for our feelings, we must be concerned with it. Consider in particular 
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attitudes of pride, regret, and shame. They are evidently backward-looking, so whether 
they’re fitting depends on the significance of our prior actions. It should be clear that pride 
and related third-personal attitudes like admiration track precisely the significance of what 
we’ve done or are about to do. You can be proud of your past pretty much to the extent that 
you’ve achieved merited success in realizing valuable goals. On the converse side, things are 
more complicated. If you ended up wasting your talents on something worthless, or never had 
a chance to pursue a worthy aim, you might rightly feel useless or sad, and possibly ashamed. 
Regret seems most clearly warranted when you had a better option available to you, but didn’t 
take it. If you don't have reason to wish you had done otherwise or that your actions would 
have had different consequences, you don’t have reason to regret. As I’ve argued, we can now 
change the significance of our past actions, and thereby either increase the strength of reasons 
to be proud of them or weaken the reasons we have to regret them. That means that insofar as 
we care about whether we can be justly proud of ourselves or avoid regret or shame, we have 
reason to care about past success or merit. 
This relates to Derek Parfit’s (1984) observation that we tend to be biased for the 
future when it comes to experiences like pain and pleasure: I’d rather have already gone to the 
dentist yesterday than face the prospect of going there tomorrow. Future pain counts for more 
than past pain. But he also noted that this bias isn’t there when it comes to pride and shame: 
I’m just as mortified by the thought of having done something shameful in the past as by the 
thought that I will do something shameful in the future. Future shame doesn’t count for more 
than past shame. Some philosophers argue that future bias is rational when it comes to 
experiential goods (Dorsey 2017b, Kauppinen 2018), while others have made a strong case it 
is never rational (Greene and Sullivan 2014). Either way, it’s difficult to see why future bias 
would be rational when it comes to non-experiential goods, including agential success. If 
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that’s the case, you rationally should care about having a better past just as much as a better 
future, if you can make a difference. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I’ve argued for three main claims. First, what makes some past investment a 
sunk cost is simply the fact that we can no longer make a (noticeable) difference to its value 
for us. Insofar as practical rationality is not just a matter of having coherent preferences but 
also having preferences that are sensitive to what is genuinely good, it is irrational for our 
decisions to be influenced by sunk costs. However, second, some past investments are not 
sunk costs, since what we do now can make a difference to their teleological significance or 
contribution to our success as agents, which is one aspect of final prudential value according 
to both Aristotelian and sophisticated subjectivist views. And finally, I’ve just argued that 
since our selves are temporally extended, there is no special puzzle about why we should care 
about making our past better for us, when we can do so.10  
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